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Abstract
This article provides a comparative conclusion to the thematic issue on the organisational characteristics of 12 right‐wing
populist parties (RWPPs) across Europe. We observe that many RWPPs—at least partially—adopt features of the mass
party model. This finding illustrates the ideological aspects behind organisational choices: For populist parties, in partic‐
ular, it is important to signal societal rootedness and “closeness to the people.” It furthermore challenges the idea that
there is a one‐way teleological movement towards more lean, electoral‐professional kinds of party organisation. At the
same time, the case studies clearly illustrate that RWPP leaders and executives continue to exercise great power over their
members, who are essentially offered “participation without power.”
Keywords
mass party; party membership; party organisation; populism; radical right
Issue
This editorial is part of the issue “Right‐Wing Populist Party Organisation Across Europe: The Survival of the Mass‐Party?”
edited by Daniele Albertazzi (University of Surrey, UK) and Stijn van Kessel (Queen Mary University of London, UK).
© 2021 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This editorial is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu‐
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
By means of 12 case studies, this thematic issue has
analysed how right‐wing populist parties (RWPPs) across
Europe organise themselves. In light of recent research
on the importance of large and rooted party organisa‐
tions for RWPP survival and success (Art, 2011; Heinisch
& Mazzoleni, 2016), we sought to interrogate the still‐
prevailing assumption that these parties rely on charis‐
matic leadership to survive and thrive (e.g., Eatwell,
2018). More specifically, each contribution assessed
whether individual RWPPs showed characteristics con‐
gruent with the “mass party” organisational model.
In the introductory article (Albertazzi & van Kessel, 2021),
we outlined three key dimensions of the mass party:
(a) the drive to recruit a large activist membership as a
way to reach out to the public through canvassing, cam‐
paigning and other means; (b) rootedness on the ground
and the provision of a variety of activities to members;
and (c) the preservation of “collective identities through
ideology” (Panebianco, 1988, p. 268), by creating closed
political communities of activists, promoting social inte‐
gration among them, and actively shaping their inter‐
pretations of political developments (Albertazzi, 2016).
We also emphasised that actual membership numbers
are not a defining criterion.
In the context of declining party membership and
perceived elite disengagement from grassroots politics,
several scholars have announced the demise of themass
party model and a shift towards, for instance, “catch‐all”
(Kirchheimer, 1966) and “cartel” (Katz & Mair, 1995) par‐
ties. However, the adoption of mass party characteristics
by several RWPPs, in particular, suggests that it may be
too soon to herald the end of this party model. For these
parties, the creation and fostering of closed communities
of political activists can in fact lend credence to their pop‐
ulist claim that they are of, and for, ordinary people, and
able to understand their needs and speak on their behalf.
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To be clear, not all RWPPs have chosen to adopt
the mass party model—there are obvious examples
of leader‐centred and light‐weight party organisations
amongst this type of party, such as the Dutch radical right
Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Freedom Party) and the ide‐
ologically more moderate parties of Silvio Berlusconi in
Italy and Andrej Babiš in the Czech Republic. Rather than
assuming that all cases covered in this thematic issue
are mass parties a priori, the contributors have assessed
the extent to which, and how, a broad variety of RWPPs
have invested in mass party structures. Bearing in mind
that mass parties offer participation to members, but
not necessarily meaningful influence (Duverger, 1951;
Michels, 1962), the contributions also examinedwhether
the selected RWPPs remained centralised in terms of
their decision‐making procedures, and whether oppor‐
tunities were provided to members to shape their par‐
ties’ direction and ideology. This concluding article high‐
lights the key comparative findings from the 12 preced‐
ing articles.
2. The Survival of the Mass Party Amongst Right‐Wing
Populist Parties?
As our 12 case studies have indicated, a consider‐
able number of RWPPs defy the common wisdom that
such parties are organisationally light‐weight and purely
leader‐centred. In many cases, RWPPs maintain an
extensive structure with an institutionalised local pres‐
ence, actively aiming to develop a grassroots following
which is tied to the party by means of organised party
activities. Several well‐established RWPPs in Western
Europe conform to the definition of the mass party,
including the Lega per Salvini Premier (LSP, League for
Salvini Premier) in Italy, the Vlaams Belang (VB, Flemish
Interest) in Belgium, the Schweizerische Volkspartei/
UnionDémocratique du Centre (SVP/UDC, Swiss People’s
Party) in Switzerland, and the Perussuomalaiset (PS, the
Finns Party) in Finland (Favero, 2021; Hatakka, 2021;
Sijstermans, 2021; Zulianello, 2021). Whilst some of
these parties may rely on highly personalised campaigns
centred on the leader—Salvini’s League being a partic‐
ularly good example—they maintain a high degree of
organisational articulation, as well as vertical linkages to
regional and local areas.
Some newer entrants in Western Europe are also
found to defy received wisdom and adopt at least some
characteristics of the mass party model. The Alternative
für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany), for
example, has lacked a single “charismatic” leader, and
developed regional and local party branches across the
country, as well as links with radical and extreme right
social movement groups and online spheres (Heinze &
Weisskircher, 2021). The absence of a dominant leader
and the presence of territorial penetration are also vis‐
ible in the case of Vox in Spain. Even though organi‐
sational development and member recruitment remain
geographically uneven, local and provincial branches are
connected to the central level through vertical links
(Barrio et al., 2021).
We also observe several RWPPs in Central and
Eastern Europe investing in mass party structures or, at
least, seeking to attain a “presence on the ground” and
connecting with grassroots supporters. This is notable
given the generally low levels of party membership
and partisan alignment in post‐communist party sys‐
tems (van Biezen et al., 2012). Building on the foun‐
dation of a predecessor party, the Eesti Konservatiivne
Rahvaerakond (EKRE, Estonian Conservative People’s
Party) has made efforts to re‐activate and expand its
local organisation, contributing to it being the fastest‐
growing Estonian party in terms of its membership
(Saarts et al., 2021). According to the analysis of Petar
Bankov, Sergiu Gherghina and Nanuli Silagadze (Bankov
et al., 2021), the VMRO‐Balgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie
(VMRO‐BND, IMRO–Bulgarian National Movement) has
also made conscious efforts to maintain strong links
with local communities through activities that give it
public visibility. Whilst formal membership numbers
remain low and branch development limited, informal
affiliations with a variety of like‐minded far right and
nationalist organisations enable the party to organise
street actions, reach out to grassroots sympathisers,
and recruit nominally independent candidates for pub‐
lic office. This more “fluid” connection with allied sub‐
cultures, the authors note, is quite typical of the radi‐
cal right in Central and Eastern Europe, and not quite in
line with the more formalised relationships in mass par‐
ties. In their contribution on the Hungarian case, Rudolf
Metz and Réka Várnagy similarly note the role of infor‐
mal networks. Describing the ideological and organisa‐
tional transformation of Fidesz‐Magyar Polgári Szövetség
(FIDESZ, Fidesz‐Hungarian Civic Alliance) in Hungary, they
argue that the party has built a “hybrid” party organi‐
sation, “which demonstrates selected characteristics of
mass parties, personal parties, movement parties, and
even cartel parties” (Metz & Várnagy, 2021, p. 318).
Whilst not a typical example of a mass party, FIDESZ has
aimed to strengthen its mobilisation capacity and collec‐
tive identity‐building in an attempt to take root in civil
society, whilst simultaneously occupying the state.
To be clear, the contributions in this thematic issue
do not point to a general and full‐fledged revival of
the mass party model across all RWPPs. This is illus‐
trated by the above examples, but also by several
other articles. In some cases the adoption of mass
party characteristics remains partial and half‐hearted,
and largely driven by a desire to signal a “closeness to
the people.” Bartek Pytlas observes how the commit‐
ment of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice)
to organisational renewal and forging linkages with its
supporter base has been largely rhetorical; the party
“put little effort into actually recruiting a large num‐
ber of engaged party members or fostering their social
rootedness” (Pytlas, 2021, p. 341). In Slovakia, the
efforts of the Slovenská Národná Strana (SNS, The Slovak
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National Party) to socialise members remained very
limited, too, irrespective of a recent rise in member‐
ship numbers. Tim Haughton, Marek Rybář and Kevin
Deegan‐Krause conclude that “the party may have been
more mass‐like than many of the newer parties in
Slovakia, but it fell well short of the mass party model”
(Haughton et al., 2021, p. 330). In the Netherlands, the
Forum voor Democratie (FvD, Forum for Democracy)
appeared to divert from the extremely leader‐centred
organisational model of the longer‐established PVV of
Geert Wilders by seeking to build a large member‐
ship (de Jonge, 2021). Léonie de Jonge nevertheless
observes that the party remained organisationally light‐
weight. Furthermore, after a period of extended organi‐
sational turmoil and defections, the FvD became increas‐
ingly dominated by its leader, Thierry Baudet, whilst
efforts to engage and socialise members remained lim‐
ited and selective.
What appears important in these latter parties’
organisational choices is the desire to avoid complicat‐
ing the management and internal structure of the party.
Pytlas (2021) argues that, in the case of PiS, central and
mid‐level party leaders likely fear the undermining of
existing power structures and the destabilising effects of
letting in engaged members. Similarly, de Jonge (2021)
notes that in the Netherlands the erstwhile architect of
FvD’s organisation, Henk Otten, was keen to limit the
influence of partisan activists in order to prevent the
internal instability that plagued theDutch right‐wing pop‐
ulist predecessor Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF, List Pim Fortuyn).
It is obvious that some RWPPs, like other parties, prefer
to adopt an “atomistic conception of party membership”
(Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 21) whereby supporters are affili‐
ated directly with the central party, avoiding the poten‐
tially destabilising influence of intermediary subnational
branches with unruly local leaders and activists.
Yet it is clear that a considerable number of RWPPs do
build extensive party organisations and invest resources
and time in attracting new members, and socialising
existing ones. These parties consider the advantages of
active membership: Members and sympathisers provide
loyal support in elections and can deliver practical ben‐
efits, such as “feet on the ground” for election cam‐
paigns (Favero, 2021; Hatakka, 2021; Sijstermans, 2021;
Zulianello, 2021). Yet at least as important appears to be
the desire to gain an aura of authenticity and respectabil‐
ity. Even in cases where actual membership numbers
remain low, like in the case of the Estonian EKRE, par‐
ties are keen to convey an image of being rooted in soci‐
ety and representing the ordinary “forgotten” people in
local communities.
It is noteworthy that traditional means of interac‐
tion and communication remain important for these
parties. Recruitment often happens through canvass‐
ing and street stalls. Parties organise in‐person events
for their members, such as political discussion meet‐
ings with invited speakers, training sessions on the eve
of election campaigns, but also more informal social
events (yearly festive meals, excursions, etc.) meant to
strengthen cohesion and trust amongst members. Tõnis
Saarts, Mari‐Liis Jakobson, and Leif Kalev, for instance,
describe how EKRE has active youth and women groups,
as well as a choir (Saarts et al., 2021). As Adrian Favero
and Judith Sijstermans observe in their case studies of
Switzerland and Belgium, respectively, community build‐
ing also involves the identification of “enemies,” such
as media organisations and established (left‐wing) politi‐
cal parties (Favero, 2021; Sijstermans, 2021). The percep‐
tion of being part of an ignored or ostracised community
tends to feed an “us” versus “them” mentality that can
strengthen intra‐party cohesiveness.
In present‐day mass parties, social media also tend
to play an important role. Niko Hatakka, for instance,
observes how the PS has a substantial online network
of activists and sympathisers which is instrumental in
increasing the party’s societal presence (Hatakka, 2021).
There are however also risks associated with this vir‐
tual form of mobilisation, in the sense that it creates
more scope for organisational and ideological disso‐
nance. In other cases, the internet also appears to play a
vital role in the building of a “modernmass party.” TheVB
is shown to extend its grassroots base beyond its for‐
mal membership via digital tools such as Facebook and
mobile apps (Sijstermans, 2021), confirming the evolv‐
ing nature of party membership (Scarrow, 2015). Mattia
Zulianello similarly observes that continuous interac‐
tion between digital and physical activism allows the
Italian League to nurture an image as a party firmly
rooted in society (Zulianello, 2021). In the Spanish and
Estonian cases, too, online platforms and communica‐
tion have been instrumental to engaging,mobilising, and
socialising activists and supporters (Barrio et al., 2021;
Saarts et al., 2021). With respect to the German case,
Anna‐Sophie Heinze and Manès Weisskircher note the
AfD’s cooperation with “alternative media” platforms
that have flourished in the German‐speaking online
sphere (Heinze &Weisskircher, 2021). Not all RWPPs are
equally tech‐savvy, however; the SVP’s digital commu‐
nication, for instance, is mainly top‐down and geared
at conveying ideological messages instead of mobilising
activists (Favero, 2021).
Altogether, the case studies suggest that many
RWPPs see value in creating extensive organisational
structures and building online and offline communities
of loyal party members or more loosely affiliated adher‐
ents. As will become clear in the next section, however,
adherence to the mass party model—whether wholly,
partially, or rhetorically—does not imply givingmembers
a meaningful voice in intra‐party affairs.
3. Centralisation of Power in RWPPs
Even though a considerable number of RWPPs involve
members in party activities and facilitate (online) plat‐
forms for discussion and interaction, the parties analy‐
sed in this thematic issue tend to be highly centralised,
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offering few opportunities to their members to influence
key decisions about internal governance, choice of can‐
didates, and ideological direction. Thus, these parties’
strategies are typically dominated by their leader along‐
side a restricted group of representatives serving in the
party executive. Whilst not all RWPPs have an unmis‐
takable “charismatic” leader or a powerful chair oper‐
ating behind the scenes—examples include the AfD and
Vox—the central leadership is usually able to instruct and
guide those at lower levels, and if need be to enforce
internal discipline. In some cases, such as the Polish PiS,
leadership is practically absolutist, whereby few key deci‐
sions are taken without the knowledge and consent of
the chair, Jarosław Kaczyński (Pytlas, 2021).
Our cases do reveal some contextual idiosyncrasies.
In the case of Spain, as Astrid Barrio, Sonia Alonso
and Bonnie Field observe, power centralisation within
the party is not only borne out of organisational and
operational needs, but also in line with Vox’s Spanish
nationalist and state centralist ideology (Barrio et al.,
2021). Efforts to centralise power inside the party
have, however, provoked serious internal disputes and
factionalism—something that has also happened in the
case of the Dutch FvD. Conversely, in the case of the
SVP/UDC, power centralisation is mitigated by the fea‐
tures of the Swiss political culture and federal system of
government (Favero, 2021). The party maintains a highly
centralised party apparatus at the national level, where
a professionalised leadership has the ability to shape
its ideology and key messages, but cantonal and local
branches retain some degree of autonomy due to the
highly decentralised political system.
Power centralisation in RWPPs almost automatically
implies that the ability of ordinary members to influence
party decisions tends to be limited. Representatives’
informal responsiveness to local activists may in some
cases give ordinary members more influence than offi‐
cial party rules suggest. Yet in almost all cases, levels
of internal democracy tend to be low—this is cer‐
tainly no different in the case of the Dutch Forum for
Democracy, whose name therefore rings somewhat iron‐
ical (de Jonge, 2021). What is more, assemblies on which
members are represented may formally be the supreme
party organs, but in practice tend to have very few oppor‐
tunities to affect the party’s strategy or to shape its key
policies. As the case of SNS illustrates particularly well,
formalmember prerogatives in the areas of policy formu‐
lation and candidate selection may prove rather mean‐
ingless in practice (Haughton et al., 2021). Across the
cases, leadership elections are generally held, but these
often have the character of a confirmatory vote rather
than a genuine contest.
There is nevertheless some variation between the
cases as well as across time. FIDESZ is a particularly
notable case; Metz and Várnagy (2021) describe how it
started out as an activist organisation adhering to prin‐
ciples of participatory democracy. Its authoritarian ide‐
ological turn and “capture” of the state in more recent
years was accompanied by the dwindling of internal
democracy, increased personalisation, and power con‐
centration in the hands of Viktor Orbán and a small party
elite in public office.
Amongst the cases in this thematic issue, EKRE, the
PS, and the AfD appear to be the parties with currently
the most developed, albeit still highly imperfect, infras‐
tructures for internal democracy. Whilst EKRE displays a
“clear preference for hierarchy over deliberation” (Saarts
et al., 2021, p. 362), it is characterised by various power
centres, and allows for grassroots initiatives and the elec‐
tion of personnel at various levels. In the case of Finland,
Hatakka (2021, p. 304) argues that the PS is “organisa‐
tionally a Frankenstein’s monster,” combining radically
democratic elements in its congress and advisory assem‐
bly with a very powerful executive which faces little
accountability. The German AfD appears to go some‐
what further in offering genuine competition in terms
of candidate selection and opportunities for members
to influence party decisions. Heinze and Weisskircher
(2021) argue that the party’s relatively decentralised
decision‐making and collective leadership has come at
the cost of constant intra‐party conflict. The desire to pre‐
vent such internal turmoil appears to be a main reason
whymost other RWPPs shy away fromeven limited forms
of internal democracy.
Generally speaking, then, RWPPs may claim to speak
in the name of the “ordinary people” who have osten‐
sibly been ignored by political elites, but this does not
mean they give their members and activists a meaning‐
ful say over party affairs and ideological direction. This is
no less the case for those RWPPs that adhere closest to
the mass party organisational model.
4. Conclusions
Defying common wisdom about this type of party, and
the direction of party evolution in general, many RWPPs
analysed in this thematic issue are committed to main‐
taining rootedness on the ground. They continue to
rely on activists or supporters to bring their message
to the electorate and to facilitate the running of the
party. In general terms, we have found that the exis‐
tence of complex and rooted organisations usually allows
party elites to shape members’ interpretations of politi‐
cal developments in their countries, facilitating the cre‐
ation of closed communities of like‐minded members.
Social media, far from being seen as an alternative to
face‐to‐face interaction, are often essential to facilitate
the organisation of in‐person activities and face‐to‐face
initiatives that allow members to interact both with the
public and with each other.
There are clearly examples of lean and leader‐
centred party organisations among our cases. These par‐
ties seem to be mainly motivated by a desire to retain
strict centralised control and avoid the cultivation of
unruly local branches and activists. For most other par‐
ties considered in this thematic issue, however, the
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encouragement of traditional means of participation,
involving actual encounters between people, is meant
to lend credence to their populist claim that they are of,
and for, ordinary people, and able to understand their
needs and speak on their behalf. We see this as a con‐
tribution to the literature worth reflecting upon, given
the tendency to study ideology and party organisations
separately, when in fact there are important ideological
aspects behind organisational choices. In other words,
organisational choices can themselves be revealed to be
“ideological products” (Scarrow, 2015, pp. 20–21).
Ultimately, the resilience of the mass party model
challenges the idea that there is some sort of one‐way,
“one‐size‐fits‐all” teleological movement towards
“electoral‐professional” forms of party organisation.
For RWPPs, in particular, it makes sense to rely upon
activism, rootedness on the ground, and the creation of
communities of loyal members, both in practical terms
(as ways to build effective campaigning machines) and
ideologically (as means through which to strengthen nar‐
ratives about parties allegedly being “close to the peo‐
ple”). For parties that place great importance on being
seen to be different from the much criticised “cartel” of
their opponents, presence on the ground and a growing
membership suits their populist identity rather well.
As for how power is shared within organisations, this
thematic issue has stressed the great influence that lead‐
ers and party executives continue to exercise over their
members. The League and the VB provide the perfect
case studies of RWPPmass parties in this respect, as they
are disciplined, pyramidal, and run from the centre. Yet
the same parties are also very able to foster participa‐
tion and interaction between their members. Our arti‐
cles thus point at the need to stop conflating internal
democracy with the opportunity to take part in a vari‐
ety of activities, interact with other members, discuss
and interrogate political events, and possibly even criti‐
cise the choices made by party elites. If anything, much
work remains to be done on why people are willing to
keep donating their time, efforts, and sometimes money
to organisations that—whilst certainly valuing what they
do—are clearly not keen to let them have a say on strat‐
egy, alliances, and choice of candidates. As we challenge
the dominant idea that political parties rely ever less on
members (e.g., Katz & Mair, 1995), we are therefore left
with the question of what motivates party members to
accept their parties’ offer of participation without power
(Albertazzi & Vampa, 2021).
Clearly, there is still a serious gap in our knowledge
about how party organisations operate, in particular
regarding the role of members and activists (Gauja &
Van Haute, 2015). As far as its contribution is concerned,
our thematic issue thus heeds calls formore comparative
work to be produced on theway party organisations actu‐
ally work, thus advancing our knowledge of what hap‐
pens inside parties and suggesting new questions about
the nature of political commitment and activism today.
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